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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite extensive deregulation in the telecommunications sector,
local voice service has proven to be the last and most difficult market to
deregulate. Perhaps the most extensive steps toward deregulation of this
last stage are being taken in Canada. In April 2006, the Canada Radio-
Television and Telecommunications Commission ("CRTC") decided it was
"prepared to forbear" from regulating the local voice service provided by
the incumbent local exchange carrier ("ILEC"), if the ILEC could show it
had lost twenty-five percent of its share in a relevant market defined by
both product (including voice-over Internet protocol or "VolP", excluding
wireless) and geography (primarily the census metropolitan area or
"CMA"). 1 ILECs were also prohibited from efforts to "winback" customers
who had switched to competitors in the prior three months, unless the ILEC
had lost twenty percent of its market.2 This decision followed a 2005
CRTC decision not to deregulate ILEC VolP service.3
The CRTC did not have the last word. Shortly after its local
forbearance decision, the Cabinet Ministers, referred to in Canada as the
Governor in Council4 of the recently established conservative government,
issued an "Order in Council" requesting that the CRTC reconsider its VolP
decision.5 The CRTC declined to forbear, claiming that VoP was in the
same market as regular voice service, which it was also refusing to forbear,
1. Forbearance from the regulation of retail local exchange services, Telecom Deci-
sion, Can. Radio-Television & Telecomm. Comm'n [CRTC] 2006-15, paras. 242, 49, 62,
158 (Apr. 6, 2006) (Can.) [hereinafter Local Decision], available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/
archive/ENG/Decisions/2006/dt2OO6-15.htm.
2. Id. at para. 488.
3. Regulatory framework for voice communication services using Internet Protocol,
Telecom Decision, CRTC 2005-28, para. 193 (May 12, 2005) [hereinafter VolP Forbear-
ance], available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/2005/dt2005-28.htm.
4. Formally, the decision comes from the Governor General, the representative of the
British monarchy in Canada, which is still a member of the Commonwealth. However, all
effective governing authority rests with Parliament, from which the Prime Minister and his
Cabinet come.
5. Order of the Governor in Council, P.C. 2006-305 (Can.), as reprinted in Reconsid-
eration of Regulatory framework for voice communication services using Internet Protocol,
Telecom Public Notice, CRTC 2006-6 app. (May 6, 2006) [hereinafter VolP Notice], avail-
able at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Notices/2006/pt2006-6.htm.
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although it did propose adopting smaller market share loss tests for
forbearance and winback.6 The Cabinet was apparently not satisfied,
leading in September of 2006 to an order reversing the CRTC's VolP
decision.7 Going further, in December 2006 the Minister of Industry
recommended to the Cabinet that it overrule the CRTC and order
forbearance for residential service where there were three nonaffiliated
facilities-based providers, two of which (including the ILEC) relied on
fixed wires. 8 Business service would be forborne with only the two fixed-
line providers.9 This proposal was adopted by the Governor in Council in
April 2007.10
These developments raise a number of economic questions to explore,
including the following issues:
Regulation within markets: Should an incumbent's substitute service
for its regulated service necessarily also be regulated when there may be
multiple and more prominent providers of the substitute?
Measuring potential share: An issue with share tests is determining
the size of the likely market open to digital voice entrants. Should it be high
volume customers who would get service at lower prices by switching to a
VolP provider?
Service market definition: To what extent is wireless in the market for
wireline service? Would a weighting scheme be appropriate?
Geographic market definition: The CRTC and Competition Bureau
("Bureau") accepted that because consumers would not regard a telephone
at some other location as a substitute for a telephone at their location, the
relevant geographic market is the location. Other geographic market
definitions were defended as mere aggregations of convenience. Is this
sensible?
6. Reconsideration of Regulatory framework for voice communication services using
Internet Protocol, Telecom Decision, CRTC 2006-53, paras. 78, 82-85 (Sept. 1, 2006) [here-
inafter VolP Reconsideration], available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/
2006/dt2006-53.htm.
7. Order of the Governor in Council Varying Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-28, P.C.
2006-1314 (Nov. 9, 2006) (Can.), as reprinted in 140 C. GAz. 24 (Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter VolP Variance], available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partI/2006/20061129/html/
sor288-e.html.
8. Hon. Maxime Bernier, Minister of Indus., Speaking Points: Variance of CRTC
Decision on Local Forbearance, (Dec. 11, 2006) (Can.), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca
/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/503cec39324f7372852564820068b211/85256a5d006b9720852572410
07482f7!OpenDocument.
9. Id.
10. Order of the Governor in Council Varying Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15, P.C.
2007-532 (Apr. 4, 2007) (Can.), as reprinted in 141 C. GAz. 8 (Apr. 18, 2007) [hereinafter
Local Variance], available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partIl/2007/20070418/html/sor71-
e.html.
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Share tests and strategic responses: Might basing forbearance on
market share introduce perverse effects on both incumbents and entrants?
Targeted low prices: Should an incumbent monopolist be allowed to
offer discount services targeted at customers who it learns are switching to
an entrant?
Defining "dominance ": Some of the parties and the Bureau expressed
at least potential concern with denial by ILECs to facilities that stand-alone
retail service providers might need to remain viable. When does a single
firm possess an "essential facility," and are effective competition law
remedies available?
Building access: To what extent should ILECs be obliged to provide
access to office buildings and apartments so entrants have an opportunity to
compete for those customers?
Timing of intervention: Should monopolization in transitioning
industries be controlled through ex ante regulation or ex post penalties?
Regulated conduct: Should competition law apply to forborne markets
if competition to those markets depends on decisions made by the
telecommunications regulator regarding access to still-regulated services?
This Article begins by describing these forbearance proceedings.
Before, during, and after the CRTC proceedings, three other agencies
played a leading role:
As in the U.S., industry participants supplied most of the comments
with stakes in the outcome. We draw on those comments, in particular, the
revealing perspectives taken by cable companies, the most likely entrant
into the local telephone business.
A three-member Telecommunications Policy Review Panel ("TPRP")
was appointed by the Canadian government in April 2005 to study
Canadian telecommunications and make policy recommendations.1' It
issued its report in March 2006, issuing numerous recommendations
regarding forbearance and postderegulation competition enforcement,
along with a range of other issues including universal service and
information technology deployment. ' 2
The Competition Bureau, the branch of the Canadian government
charged with enforcing the Competition Act and serving as an advocate for
competition more generally filed comments in the CRTC forbearance
proceeding and to the TPRP. It made available for public comment a draft
Bulletin on Abuse of Dominance in the Telecommunications Industry
11. Teleconm. Policy Review Panel, Final Report 2006 (2006) (Can.) [hereinafter
TPRP Report], available at http://www.telecomreview.ca/epic/site/tprpgecrt.nsf/vwapj/
reporte.pdf/$FILE/reporte.pdf.
12. Id.
[Vol. 60
CANADIAN DEREGULATION
("Telecommunications Abuse Bulletin"), indicating how it might enforce
the Telecommunications Act in this sector as it becomes more open to
competition, and now it sees its role vis-6-vis the CRTC.'3
Last, and perhaps most, the Minister of Industry, in charge of Industry
Canada (which, along with Heritage Canada, oversees the CRTC),"4 has the
right to recommend that the CRTC reverse itself or that the Governor in
Council overturn the CRTC's position.
After describing the roles of these parties in the development of
Canadian telecommunications policy, we comment briefly on the economic
questions listed above, followed by a brief conclusion that the Canadian
experience has much to offer telecommunications policy analysts,
particularly in the U.S.
II. THE CRTC FORBEARANCE PROCEEDINGS
A. Local Telephone Service
During the 1990s, the CRTC made a series of decisions to open a
wide range of telecommunications services to competition and to lift price
regulation of the services. The overall standard for forbearance or
refraining from regulation is set out in Section 34(1) of the Canadian
Telecommunications Act, 15 where the Commission finds as a question of
fact that to refrain would be consistent with the Canadian
telecommunications policy objectives.
The objectives defined in Section (7) of that act include "(f) to foster
increased reliance on market forces for the provision of
telecommunications services and to ensure that regulation, where required,
is efficient and effective."' 16
As was true of the U.S., by the mid-1990s, the primary remaining
unregulated market was local telephone service, which in Canada is
regulated nationally rather than provincially. In 1997, in anticipation of
entry into local telecommunications, the CRTC set out a list of rules, not
dissimilar to the framework in the U.S. Telecommunications Act and
13. Competition Bureau, Draft Information Bulletin on the Abuse of Dominance Provi-
sions as Applied to the Telecommunications Industry (2006) (Can.) [hereinafter Telecomm.
Abuse Bulletin], available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/PDFs/TABE.pdf.
14. Although the Canadian department through which the CRTC reports is the Ministry
of Heritage, the Cabinet department with the greatest direct interest in telecommunications
(as opposed to, say, content rules for broadcasting) is Industry Canada. It is as if the U.S.
telecommunications decisions of the FCC were subject to review by the Secretary of Com-
merce and subject to being overruled by a vote of the Cabinet.
15. Telecommunications Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 38, § 34(1) (Can.), available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/LEGAL/TELECOM.HTM.
16. Id. at § 7(f).
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subsequent FCC proceedings, 7 for regulating access to operation systems,
"essential facilities," and interconnection with incumbent local
telecommunications companies."
In April 2004, Aliant Telecom, the [LEC for Atlantic Canada 19 and a
subsidiary of Bell Canada Enterprises, Canada's largest
telecommunications carrier, petitioned the CRTC to forbear from requiring
approved tariffs for local service in thirty-two of its exchanges. 20 Aliant
also requested that the CRTC remove winback rules, which prevented
regulated local carriers from soliciting business from customers who had
switched to a competitor for twelve months, and allow Aliant to waive
service charges for those who switched back.21 According to Aliant,
forbearance would, to combine clauses of the Telecommunications Act, be
"consistent with the Canadian telecommunications policy objective .... to
foster increased reliance on market forces. 2 2 Aliant's primary argument
was that it was facing significant competition in those service areas from a
facilities-based entrant, EastLink. 3 Aliant stated that in these local
exchanges, EastLink was serving twenty-one percent of the residential lines
by the end of 2003 and thirty-three percent by August 2005, and it cited
press reports of even more.24
Responding to this request on April 28, 2005, the CRTC issued a
public notice requesting comment on the standards for forbearing from
regulation of local service, including changing or amending the rules on
winback and waiving switching charges.25 In the notice, the CRTC stated
that forbearance would not be appropriate if the incumbent has "substantial
market power., 26 The CRTC would assess market power by looking at
market share, willingness of consumers to switch to other providers in
response to an increase in price, and the ability of those rivals to increase
17. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
18. Local Competition, Telecom Decision, CRTC 97-8 (May 1, 1997), available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Decisions/1997/DT97-8.HTM.
19. New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Labrador, and Newfoundland.
20. Forbearance from regulation of local exchange services, Telecom Public Notice,
CRTC 2005-2, para. 5 (Apr. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Local Notice], available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/eng/Notices/2005/pt2005-2.htm.
21. Id. at para. 6.
22. ALIANT TELECOM., INC., FORBEARANCE APPLICATION FOR RESIDENTIAL WIRELINE
LOCAL SERVICES IN SPECIFIED EXCHANGES, at para. 170 (Apr. 7, 2004) (Can.) (internal cita-
tions omitted), available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2004/8640/aliant/040407.zip.
23. Id. at paras. 33-59.
24. Id. at paras. 55-56; Letter from Richard A. Stephen, Director of Regulatory Matters,
to Diane Rhdaume, Secretary General, CRTC (Sept. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2005/8640/aliant/050926.pdf.
25. Local Notice, supra note 20.
26. Id. atparas. 13-14.
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output in response to that demand.27 The relevant market would be
determined using a framework roughly (but only roughly) akin to the U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and the Bureau's Merger Enforcement Guidelines, in which one
asks which products and over what region a firm "with market power"
would need to control to "profitably impose a sustainable price increase" of
unspecified magnitude or significance. 28 The CRTC invited comment on a
number of framework issues. These included designating the services to be
forborne; defining markets along geographic and service dimensions;
specifying criteria for forbearance; identifying which CRTC regulations
might be retained; and handling transitional issues if, post-forbearance,
market performance is not sufficiently competitive.29
After nearly a year of comments and replies, interrogatories and
responses, and oral testimony, the CRTC issued its decision on April 6,
2006.30 To paraphrase, the CRTC set out three main criteria: (1) the ILEC
has to demonstrate "rivalrous behaviour," e.g., active marketing, falling
prices, and significant activity by competitors; 3' (2) the ILEC has in place
tariffs for "Competitor Services"-what might be called "network
elements" in the U.S., including operational support systems-and meets
specified quality standards in their provision;3 2 (3) most controversially, the
ILEC needs to lose twenty-five percent of market share, calculated on the
basis of wireline connections." The immediate controversies were whether
this share was too high-the ILECs recommended much lower shares, e.g.,
five percent; their opponents recommended thirty to thirty-five percent-
and whether calculating shares based on wireline connections unduly
excluded wireless phone service from the relevant service market.
34
27. Id.
28. Id. at para. 17. The phrase "a firm with market power" introduces an unfortunate
and unnecessary circularity: merger-based approaches invoke a "hypothetical monopolist."
For the applicable merger guidelines from which this perspective is generally based, see
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(revised Apr. 8, 1997) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm; CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU, MERGER
ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES (2004) [hereinafter MERGER ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES],
available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/epic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/
2004%20MEGs.Final.pdf/$file/2004%20MEGs.Final.pdf.
29. Local Notice, supra note 20, at paras. 21-33.
30. Local Decision, supra note 1.
31. Id. at paras. 242(e), 279-80.
32. Id. at paras. 242(b)-(d), 256-78.
33. Id. at paras. 242(a), 244-54.
34. Id. at paras. 172, 195, 208, 229, 234 (Canadian Cable Television Association, East-
Link, FCI/Yak, and Consumer Groups all supporting thirty percent).
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With respect to market definition, the CRTC found that the services
market included primary and secondary lines, VolP service, and bundles.35
It included resellers in the market with facilities-based providers but said
that wireless was in a separate market on the basis of pricing, marketing,
and a paucity of customers who had dropped wireline for wireless.36 It also
placed business and residential services in separate markets, also on the
basis of separate pricing and marketing.37
On the geographic side, the CRTC claimed that antitrust principles
would warrant a finding that "the geographic component of the relevant
market for local exchange services would be each location, as buyers
would not be willing to substitute calling from their location for calling
from another location. '3 However, it found that this level of aggregation,
or the next lowest level, the local exchange, would be impractical. The
CRTC considered proposals from the local exchange, through local
connection or interconnection areas, up to an entire province or ILEC
operating territory. It found that the appropriate geographic market on the
basis of common interests and circumstances would be the census
metropolitan area ("CMA"), with rural Canadian geographic markets
identified as economic regions, as defined by Statistics Canada.39
The CRTC said that it would retain regulatory authority even if
forbearance were granted in a number of areas. All carriers would be
required to provide reciprocal interconnection, wireless interconnection,
local number portability, 911 service, privacy safeguards, and a number of
other consumer protections. 40 ILECs would be required to offer stand-alone
voice service under a ceiling price to protect legacy low-volume or low-
income subscribers who would not likely be served by competitors.4 '
ILECs would also provide directories and directory entries free of charge.42
The CRTC would also retain authority to rule on claims of undue
discrimination in prices or terms of service.43 Perhaps most important, the
competitor services requirements would force ILECs to provide facilities
under tariff to firms that wanted to use those facilities to provide
telecommunications services at retail.44
35. Id. at paras. 45, 47-48.
36. Id. at paras. 45, 57-62.
37. Id. at paras 75-78.
38. Id. at para. 141.
39. Id. at paras. 141, 158, 165.
40. Id. at app. C.
41. Id. atpara. 452.
42. Id. at paras. 397-99.
43. Id. at para. 461.
44. Id. at paras. 262-275.
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The CRTC retained the winback rule out of concern that ILEC
immediate response would stifle entrants, but it allowed ILECs to go after
lost customers after three months instead of twelve and would remove the
rule for ILECs who had lost twenty percent market share.45 Finally, with
respect to the bottom line-Alaint's petition-the CRTC considered it only
for the Halifax area, where Aliant had met the twenty-five percent share
loss criterion.46 However, for Halifax, the CRTC found that Aliant had not
provided competitor services meeting quality standards for a sufficiently
long period and thus failed to meet the other forbearance tests.47
B. VoIP Forbearance
While its rulemaking on local forbearance was proceeding, the CRTC
was also engaged in an assessment of whether to forbear from regulating
ILEC-provided telephone service over digital Internet networks, i.e.,
VoIP. 48 This proceeding was initiated by a request from Bell Canada in
November 2003, with a public notice soliciting comment issued in April
2004.49 In that notice, the CRTC set out a framework that it largely
reiterated when it issued its decision in May 2005, just after issuing its
request for comments on overall forbearance.
50
The CRTC's reasoning can be essentially summarized by the
following syllogism: ILECs (subject to the outcome of the general
forbearance proceeding) were dominant in the market for standard voice
telephone service, holding ninety-two percent of business revenues and
ninety-eight percent of residential.5' VolP and standard voice telephone
service are in the same market.52 Therefore, the ILEC is dominant in VolP
and should remain regulated.
5 3
This put the advocates of deregulation, primarily the ILECs, into a bit
of a logical bind. To argue for forbearance from regulation of their VolP
services, they would have had to argue that VolP and standard service were
in separate markets to warrant separate treatment. On the other hand, that
45. Id. at paras. 483-86.
46. Id. at para. 504.
47. Id. atparas. 505,508-10.
48. Other telecommunications proceedings of particular note taking place during this
time involved assessment of the implementation of price caps and the definition of essential
facilities. We do not discuss these in detail here.
49. See Regulatory Framework for Voice Communication Services using Internet Pro-
tocol, Telecom Public Notice, CRTC 2004-2 (Apr. 7, 2004) at para. 6, available at
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/archive/ENG/Notices/2004/pt2004-2.htm.
50. See VolP Forbearance, supra note 3.
51. Id. atpara. 131.
52. Id. atpara. 126.
53. Id. atparas. 170-71.
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narrow market definition would exclude their main local service
competitor, VolP over cable networks, and thus undercut their main
argument for forbearance overall.
However, the VoP proceeding was not over-and, as we see below,
neither was the proceeding regarding whether to continue regulation of
local service overall. As we discuss in more detail below, under Canadian
administrative law, the CRTC, although nominally an independent
authority, is subject to review by the Cabinet Ministers, which in Canada is
composed of members of Parliament from the ruling political party. In
January 2006, it became a Conservative minority government. In May
2006, the Governor in Council issued an order to refer this VolP decision
back to the CRTC for reconsideration.54 This followed a recommendation
of the then-Liberal Minister of Industry, David Emerson, in September of
2005." The primary basis for the reconsideration was the view that market
forces should play an increasing role in Canadian telecommunications.
Following a call for comments, the CRTC issued a VoP
reconsideration decision on September 1, 2006.56 The CRTC continued to
refuse to forbear from regulating ILEC VoP services, following its earlier
reasoning. Its reasoning was reinforced by its decision a few months earlier
not to forbear from regulating local exchange service unless conditions
regarding market share, rivalry, and competitor services standards were
met.57 It reiterated its view that VoP and local exchange voice service
were in the same market on the basis of purpose of the services, similar
marketing, consumer perception of substitutability, and ability of VoP and
voice service to replace each other's functionality-particularly with local
number portability.5 8
The CRTC argued, in addition, that forbearing VoP but continuing to
regulate circuit-switched service "would provide artificial incentives for the
ILECs to invest in that technology, which could in turn distort the
competitive market. ' 59 However, it did make a few concessions toward the
Cabinet, which was clearly signaling its displeasure with the CRTC's pace
of deregulation. In light of what it regarded as more recent data regarding
54. See VoIP Notice, supra note 5, at para. 6.
55. This doesn't necessarily reflect bipartisan consensus toward deregulation. Follow-
ing the January 2006 Parliamentary election in which the Conservatives won the plurality of
seats and took control of government from the Liberals, Mr. Emerson switched parties, and
was given the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
56. See VolP Reconsideration, supra note 6.
57. See id. at paras. 65, 67, 78.
58. See id. at paras. 58-65.
59. Id. at para. 76. This followed the CRTC's discussion in its VolP Forbearance deci-
sion of the ILEC incentive to migrate customers from regulated switched service to unregu-
lated VolP service. VolP Forbearance, supra note 3, at paras. 158, 185.
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competition from non-ILEC VoIP, the CRTC solicited comments on
whether the twenty-five percent lost-share-test for forbearance and the
twenty percent lost-share-test for eliminating winback rules were
appropriate.60
This did not end the story, as the new Minister of Industry and
Governor in Council intervened in the larger question of overall local
exchange forbearance. The CRTC and the Governor in Council were not
operating in a vacuum. Before describing those interventions and where
forbearance stands today, we review actions of other significant
participants in the Canadian policy debate-industry participants, the
Telecommunications Policy Review Panel, and the Competition Bureau.
III. THE PARTIES
A. Industry Participants
A large number of private parties filed comments to the CRTC in the
forbearance proceeding. The participants can be grouped into three
categories-ILECs, facilities-based competitors, and firms offering VolP
over ILEC or cable facilities.
Although Aliant, the ILEC serving Atlantic Canada, petitioned for
forbearance, the most extensive sets of comments were filed by the two
largest ILECs in Canada, Bell Canada and Telus. Bell Canada is the
primary ILEC serving Ontario and Quebec; Telus serves British Columbia
and Alberta in western Canada. Needless to say, both parties supported
deregulation, with filings substantially akin to those that ILECs might file
in the U.S. on similar proceedings. Experts filing statements for Telus
included Dennis Weisman of Kansas State University; Robert Crandall of
the Brookings Institution, Alfred Kahn of Cornell University, and NERA
Economic Consulting.6 Bell's experts included Donald McFetridge at
Carleton University in Ottawa and Henry Ergas of Charles River's
Australia office.62
Their arguments had much in common, citing the virtues of
competition, pricing flexibility and the extent of competition. The relevant
market for local services should include wireless providers and "access
60. See VoW Reconsideration, supra note 6, at paras. 82-84.
61. Telus Communications Inc., Comments, Before the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2, Forbearance from
Regulation of Local Exchange Services (June 22, 2005), 9.
62. Bell Canada and T61bec, socidt6 en commandite, Submission, Before the Canadian
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, Telecom Public Notice CRTC
2005-2, Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Services (June 22, 2005), app. A,
B.
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independent" stand-alone providers as well as facilities-based carriers.6 3
Bell's inclusion of stand-alone providers was predicated on continuation of
wholesale regulation that would "ensure that ILEC competitors can readily
buy essential and non-essential network elements to quickly expand their
own facilities or resell ILEC services ... ,"64 For Telus, the key factor
should be the presence of a single facilities-based alternative provider,
generally cable-provided VolP.65 Both parties thought that there should be
a share test but recommended five percent (including stand-alone VolP and
wireless-only households), rather than the CRTC's twenty-five percent.6 6
Bell Canada argued that the relevant geographic market is the local
exchange, while Telus thought that the relevant area for forbearance was
the serving area of the ILEC.67
A second group is the stand-alone service provider, of which Primus
Telecommunications Canada ("Primus") is a leading representative.
Primus's main concern is that the CRTC preserve the ability of stand-alone
providers to compete by ensuring access to ILEC facilities at regulated
wholesale prices.68  Primus characterizes stand-alone providers as
equivalent to facilities-based providers, regarding vertical integration by
cable into retail voice service by purchasing a stand-alone provider as pre-
empting independent entry.6 9 In Primus's view, vertical integration will
lead to an "inevitable price squeeze" that will put the stand-alone providers
out of business. 70 Even with wholesale access, stand-alone providers are at
a competitive disadvantage by not being able to bundle wireless with
telephone and Internet service.7 1 Primus argued that ILECs should be
63. Bell Canada and Tdlbec, socidt6 en commandite, Submission, Forbearance from
Regulation of Local Exchange Services, Telecom Public Notice, CRTC 2005-2, at para. 63
(June 22, 2005) [hereinafter Bell Submission], available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/
partvii/2005/8640/bell/050622_1 .zip.
64. Id. atpara. 146.
65. See Telus Communications, Inc., Comments, Forbearance from Regulation of Local
Exchange Services, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2, at paras. 25-26 (June 22, 2005)
[hereinafter Telus Comments], available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2005
/8640/telus/050622.zip.
66. See id. See also Bell Submission, supra note 63, at paras. 106, 114 (explaining that
the five percent test was based in part on a test that the CRTC employs to determine when
cable systems should be deregulated).
67. See Bell Submission, supra note 63, at paras. 100-04; Telus Comments, supra note
65, at para. 140 (rejecting an analysis based on market definition as such and proposing
instead to count the number of facilities based providers).
68. Letter from Jonathan L. Holmes, Director Regulatory Affairs, Primus, to CRTC,
paras. 9, 13 (June 22, 2005), available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2005/8640
/primus/050622.doc.
69. Id. at para. 7.
70. Id. at para. 8.
71. Id.
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reregulated if their shares become sixty-five to seventy percent after
forbearance; 72 this presumably is a necessary condition for forbearance as
well.
The most surprising and informative comments were those from a
third group-the cable companies. Rogers is the primary cable competitor
to Bell in eastern Canada, and Shaw is the primary competitor to Telus in
western Canada. One would expect that if X is dominant, and Y is in its
competitive fringe, Y would prefer that X be deregulated. X would raise its
price, increasing Y's market share and profits. Here, however, the
seemingly fringe competitors, the cable companies, wanted regulation
retained.
The main institutional spokesperson for the cable sector is the
Canadian Cable Television Association ("CCTA"). Rogers essentially
signed onto the CCTA comments; 73 Shaw filed extensive comments on its
own.74 As with the ILECs, the comments resembled what one would see in
the U.S.; CCTA submitted comments from David Gillen and Thomas Ross
of the Sauder School of Business at the University of British Columbia."
CCTA opposed forbearance, claiming that the local telephone market is not
yet competitive.76 Before forbearance can be granted, the CRTC should
require that ILECs have lost thirty percent to competitors and that,
following annual reviews, competitive alternatives are "pervasive and
sustained." 
77
CCTA advocated as the geographic market the "local interconnection
region," defined as an area over which local exchange carriers exchange
traffic without going through an interexchange carrier.78 Within such an
area, according to the CCTA, competitive carriers would not engage in
price discrimination.79 This matters because the prime concern of the
72. Id. at para. 23.
73. Written comments from Rogers Commc'ns, Inc. on Telecom Public Notice, CRTC
2005-2; Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Services, para. 1 (June 22, 2005),
available at http://www.crtc.gc.calpublic/partvii/2005/8640/rogers/050622.pdf.
74. Shaw Cablesystems G.P., Comments, Before the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2, Forbearance from
Regulation of Local Exchange Services (June 22, 2005).
75. Canadian Cable Telecommunications Association, Written Comments, Before the
Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, Telecom Public Notice
CRTC 2005-2, Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Services (June 22, 2005),
Attachment 1.
76. Written comments from the Can. Cable Telecomm. Ass'n on Telecom Public Notice
CRTC 2005-2; Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Services paras. 10-11 (June
22, 2005), available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/ 2005/8640/ccta/050622.zip.
77. Id. at para. 12.
78. Id. at para. 40.
79. Id.
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CCTA is not that the ILEC would set prices too high but that it would
engage in "targeted pricing," i.e., cutting price selectively to its
competitor's customers.80 CCTA went on to argue that the ILECs had
ninety-one to ninety-five percent of the residential customers across
Canada, based on 2005 data, falling only about two percentage points per
year.81 CCTA also argued that expansion by cable companies into the
ILEC's markets would be time-consuming and with high sunk costs-and
unlikely if the cable companies faced targeted pricing.82
Shaw's filing emphasized a different set of difficulties. It said that to
enter the market, it would require access to Telus's "support structures"
(e.g., poles), rights-of-way, multitenant buildings, and other
"interconnection arrangements. 83 Shaw claimed that Telus discriminated
against it in getting such access.84 Shaw also proposed specific tests for
reregulation: if competitors "experienc[e] substantial.., problems" getting
access to support structures, or the ILEC obtains its preforbearance market
share and it "sustains a price premium" of five percent.85
B. Telecommunications Policy Review Panel
While the CRTC undertook its forbearance review, the Canadian
government initiated a separate review of telecommunications policy. At
about the same time, David Emerson, the Minister of Industry in 2005, who
led the Cabinet to have the CRTC reconsider its VolP decision, appointed
three leading telecommunications industry participants, specializing in
technology, law, and finance, to a Telecommunications Policy Review
Panel ("TPRP").86 The TPRP spent roughly a year studying Canadian
telecommunications, including an extensive process soliciting comments
from largely the same participants in the CRTC proceedings, on many
overlapping issues. On March 20, 2006, the TPRP issued a nearly 400-page
report with 127 detailed recommendations, many with multiple parts. 87 The
report covered telecommunications policy objectives, choosing between
80. Id. at paras. 56-59.
81. Id. atpara. 79.
82. Id. atparas. 103-07.
83. Comments from Shaw Cablesystems G.P. on Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2;
Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Service, paras. 9-10 (June 22, 2005),
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2005/8640/shaw/050622.zip.
84. Id.
85. Id. at para. 17.
86. Telecomm. Policy Review Panel, Who Are We?, (Can.)
http://www.telecomreview.ca/epic/site/tprp-gecrt.nsf/en/h_rxOO094e.html (last visited Mar.
15, 2008).
87. TPRP Report, supra note 11.
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regulation and competition, access to support structures, spectrum policy,
use of information technology, universal service, and institutional design.
The TPRP Report's ("Report") contents most germane to the CRTC's
proceedings first are those in chapter three, "Economic Regulation." Most
of the recommendations expressed a conviction that competition should be
used instead of regulation "to the maximum extent feasible."88 The
Canadian Telecommunications Act should be amended to put the
presumption in favor of markets with regulation requiring a finding of
market power, rather than presuming regulation absent a case for
forbearance. 89 Although this suggests that the burden of proof rests with
those seeking regulation, the Report says in another recommendation that
regulation be removed only after a review "concludes that there is no
longer any significant market power ... ,90
With regard to targeted pricing-the main concern raised by the
opponents of forbearance-the Report recommended switching from ex
ante prohibitions to ex post evaluation under the Competition Act.91 ILEC
pricing should be fully flexible in forborne markets, "unless they are part of
a practice that is determined to be anti-competitive conduct.' 92 The TPRP
proposed that this ex post determination would be made by a
"Telecommunications Competition Tribunal" ("TCT").93 The TPRP
recommended creating the TCT as a special agency that, during a five-year
transition to deregulation, would determine if regulated markets sufficiently
lack market power to be forborne; identify which wholesale access services
(to stand-alone providers) should continue to be tariffed; review
applications for reregulation and telecommunications mergers; and
adjudicate allegations of allegedly anticompetitive conduct (e.g., targeted
pricing).94 The three TCT members would come from the CRTC, the head
of the Competition Bureau or her designate, and a third member selected by
the Governor in Council.95
Because of the change in governments in January 2006, the TPRP
Report was delivered to a different Minister of Industry than the one who
asked for it. Nevertheless, its deregulatory tone was in line with the view of
the new Minister, Maxime Bernier. On June 13, Minister Bernier asked
88. Id. at Recommendation 3-1.
89. Id. at Recommendation 3-3.
90. Id. at Recommendation 3-4.
91. Id. at 3-23 to 3-25.
92. Id. at Recommendation 3-12.
93. Id. at 4-3 (using the Competition Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body that adjudicates
noncriminal Competition Act cases in Canada, as the model for the Telecomm. Competition
Tribunal).
94. Id. at 4-17; see also id. at Recommendations 4-15 to 4-17.
95. Id. at Recommendation 4-3 to 4-5.
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Parliament to issue a "policy direction" under the Telecommunications Act
that the CRTC "rely on market forces to the maximum extent feasible,"
with regulation being efficient, proportionate, and neutral with regard to
provider, technology, and entry.96 This set the stage for the Minister's
subsequent actions on forbearance. But before we get to those, we turn to
the Competition Bureau's participation.
C. Competition Bureau
The Competition Bureau, part of Industry Canada, is responsible for
investigating and enforcing the Competition Act, which covers both
traditional antitrust concerns such as collusion, abuse of dominance,
mergers, and also consumer protection law. If it finds violations, it can (and
in the case of criminal violations, must) hand over prosecution to the
Competition Law Division of the Canadian Department of Justice. As with
the U.S. competition agencies-the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission-it often acts as the advocate for competition principles
in regulatory proceedings.
97
In its role as competition advocate, the Bureau filed comments on
June 22, 2005, before the CRTC regarding forbearance.96 The Bureau did
not believe it had sufficient information to state whether the CRTC should
forbear.99 It recommended that the CRTC use the Bureau's Merger
Enforcement Guidelines as a framework for ascertaining whether an ILEC
would have sufficient market power to merit continued regulation. 00
Evidence on whether wireless was in the market was "inconclusive."' 0 ' The
Bureau deferred on specifics, instead detailing how it goes about defining
markets. It did accept location-specific geographic markets as a starting
point but then said that similarities across adjacent locations would warrant
defining markets in terms of the extent of the overlap of the service
footprints of rival networks. 0 2 The Bureau recognized targeted pricing and
96. Hon. Maxime Bernier, Minister of Indus., Speaking Points: 2006 Canadian Telecom
Summit, (June 13, 2006) (Can.), available at
http://www.ic.gc.ca/cmb/welcomeic.nsf/503cec39324f7372852564820068b211/85256a5d00
6b97208525718cOO5d5ca!OpenDocument.
97. Under the Canadian parliamentary system, the Bureau also can play a similar advi-
sory role in proposing and assessing legislative proposals that affect the level of competition
in the Canadian economy.
98. Evidence from the Comm'r of the Competition Bureau on Telecom Public Notice
CRTC 2005-2, Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Services (June 22, 2005)
(Can.), available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca/public/partvii/2005/8640/comm-comp/050
622.zip.
99. Id. at para. 10.
100. Id. at para. 29.
101. Id. at para. 122.
102. Id. at paras. 256-57.
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"consumer poaching" as a problem in theory but discussed it in terms of
how it assesses general predatory pricing allegations. 0 3 It suggested that
such claims could be left to enforcement ex post if the conditions for
forbearance were met.l°4
On August 15, 2005, the Bureau submitted comments to the TPRP on
a largely similar set of issues.'0 " Perhaps its key contribution was that two
facilities-based networks "may" provide sufficient competition to warrant
forbearance if the entrant can match the ILEC's costs, consumers regard
the offerings as having similar features and quality, and coordinated pricing
is unlikely. 10 6 The Bureau expressed some doubts about the prospect that
targeted pricing could induce cable exit from voice telephony, particularly
because most of its costs, the cable network itself, are sunk but again said
that the Competition Act enforcement could handle situations that may
arise.'07
The Bureau noted the difficulty of regulation in sectors with rapid
technological change or participation by firms in an unregulated market
(e.g., regulating wholesale access by an ILEC that also sells service at
retail). 108 In contrast to some industry participants, it said that competition
among stand-alone providers does not render a market competitive if there
is little competition at the facilities level.' 09 Moreover, competition at retail
by facilities-based providers weakens the case for access regulation
benefiting stand-alone providers."0 Interconnection regulation among
facilities-based providers, however, may be needed to prevent mutual
agreements that could raise service prices across the market."'
The Bureau reiterated its arguments made regarding the effectiveness
of a duopoly in the Commissioner's oral testimony before the CRTC on
September 27, 2005.1 12 It said there that the CRTC could streamline its
103. See id. at paras. 234-45, 269-70.
104. Id. at paras. 297-98.
105. Comments of the Commissioner of Competition, Telecomm. Policy Review (Aug.
15, 2005) [hereinafter Comments of the Commissioner], available at
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/PDFs/bureaucomments-tpr-2005.08.15.pdf.
106. Id. atpara. 29.
107. Id. at paras. 33-34.
108. Id. at paras. 45-47. See also Timothy J. Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should be
Kept Out of Unregulated Markets.: Understanding the Divestiture in U.S. v. AT&T, ANTI-
TRUST BULLETIN 32, 741-93 (1987) (discussing the competitive risks in allowing regulated
firms to participate in unregulated markets).
109. Comments of the Commissioner, supra note 105, at para. 60.
110. Id. at paras. 56-58.
111. Id. at paras. 71-72. See also Timothy J. Brennan, Industry Parallel Interconnection
Agreements, INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY 9, 133-49 (1997).
112. Forbearance from Regulation of Local Exchange Services, Oral Presentation of the
Commissioner of Competition, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2 (Sept. 27, 2005)
(Can.), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/PDFs/2005-09-27_comm_
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assessments by granting forbearance when there are two facilities-based
providers, including the ILEC. The ILEC's rival has to be able to offer a
product in the relevant market with variable costs no greater than the
ILEC's, lack capacity constraints, and have shown it can retain
customers." 13 Evidence of rivalry and the unlikelihood of collusion would
also be required.! 4 Predation was again thought unlikely, but as it cannot
be ruled out completely, a temporary price ceiling with downward pricing
flexibility could be justified as a transitional measure. One notable
omission here was any mention of a share-based test.
The Bureau's most recent statement followed the CRTC's decisions
on forbearance and the TPRP Report, in a draft Bulletin on Abuse of
Dominance in the Telecommunications Industry, and provides public
guidance on how it would apply abuse of dominance provisions in
Canada's Competition Act to the telecommunications industry if and when
local service is forborne from regulation."15 The purpose was to describe
Bureau enforcement policy as deregulation ensues and the
telecommunication sector falls less under the authority of the CRTC and
more under general competition law." 6 Since the main concerns raised
regarding forbearance would fall primarily under the abuse of dominance
provisions in the Competition Act-either refusal to grant access to stand-
alone service providers or targeted predatory pricing---confidence in
forbearance could depend on confidence that ex post enforcement rather
than ex ante regulation would suffice to prevent anticompetitive conduct. 17
speech.pdf.
113. Id. atpara. 11.
114. Id. atparas. 37-41.
115. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13. The June release date is given in Press
Release, Competition Bureau, Commissioner of Competition Comments on Government's
Decision to Deregulate Local Telecommunications Sector (Apr. 4, 2007) (Can.), available
at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cftn?itemlD=2296&g=e. Such Bu-
reau statements are not infrequent. Its bulletins and guidelines cover a wide range of prac-
tices including general abuse of dominance, mergers and predatory pricing, along with issu-
ances regarding specific industries or sectors including intellectual property, gasoline, and
groceries.
116. The document could also be a response to the TPRP's recommendation to create a
Telecommunications Competition Tribunal. See TPRP Report, supra note 11 and accompa-
nying text. Since the Bureau would both prepare cases and, under that proposal, adjudicate
them, there could be some interest in describing how general competition law would apply
and, implicitly, to suggest that a TCT is unnecessary.
117. In Canada, like the U.S., the stated objective of competition law is protecting the
welfare benefits of competition rather than the status of particular competitors. Unlike the
U.S., Canada uses a total welfare (weighted for distributional effect when appropriate)
rather than consumer welfare. Merger enforcement has brought this out most clearly. In its
abuse of dominance provisions, efficiency considerations on the supply side may play a role
in establishing motives for allegedly exclusionary conduct other than targeting rivals.
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Fourteen comments on the draft were posted on the Bureau's Web site as of
January 29, 2007.118
The draft Bulletin begins by discussing market definition, which is
problematic for single firms whose profit-maximizing price is at levels
where consumers begin to regard other products as substitutes. 19
Acknowledging the difficulty, the Bureau lists a number of empirical tests
regarding lack of price correlation and substitution to indicate whether a
single firm, e.g., a forborne ILEC, meets statutory criteria for dominance.
20
On the geographic side, the Bureau accepts the view that the customer's
location is the theoretically proper geographic market but admits the value
of aggregation on the basis of the similarity of competitive alternatives. 21
After discussing the roles of market share, entry barriers, and large
buyer bargaining in assessing the magnitude of market power, the Bureau
turns to potential abusive practices. The Bureau calls its first category
64 ,122
"raising rivals' costs and market foreclosure. Under this category falls
denial of interconnection or access to network elements. 23 The Bureau will
consider them only when the access is denied to unregulated services,
citing a "regulated conduct" defense-that regulatory authority takes
precedence-when access remains overseen by the CRTC.' 24 The Bureau
also discusses in this section margin squeezes and denials to "essential
facilities.' ' 25 Although denial of access may meet the definition of an
anticompetitive act if it eliminates stand-alone providers whose customers
lack access to competitive alternatives, the Bureau will inquire if there
would be substantially more competition in downstream retail markets but
for the practice. 126 Mere elimination of stand-alone providers is not
118. Competition Bureau Seeks Public Comments on its Bulletin on the Abuse of Domi-
nance Provisions as applied to the Telecommunications Industry (Jan. 29, 2007) (Can.),
available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/intemet/index.cfm?itemlD=2251 &lg--e.
119. Misdefining firms with market power as competitive because of rivalry at monop-
oly prices is known as the Cellophane fallacy, following an error by the U.S. Supreme Court
in a 1956 decision in an antitrust case brought against DuPont. United States v. du Pont &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
120. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13, at 5-6.
121. Id. at 9.
122. Id. at 14.
123. Id. at 15.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 16-19. The Bureau elaborated its views on what makes a facility essential in
Review of Regulatory Framework for Wholesale Service and Definition of
Essential Service, Evidence of the Commissioner of Competition, Telecom
Public Notice, CRTC 2006-14 (Mar. 15, 2007) (Can.), available at http://www.crtc.gc.ca
/public/partvii/2006/8663/c 12_200614439/737543.zip.
126. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13, at 18, 22. This "but for" test was set out
by the Canadian Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Competition v. Canada Pipe Co.,
2006 FCA 233, para. 38 (Can.).
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sufficient to conclude that a squeeze or access denial would violate the
Competition Act. 1
27
The other categories of conduct include predatory pricing, targeted
pricing, and bundling. 128 With regard to predation, the Bureau will consider
cases only when alleged predatory prices are below both the complainant's
and alleged predator's costs and recoupment of losses from below-cost
pricing is likely.1 29 In doing so, the Bureau recognizes that residual
regulation could inhibit recoupment (by capping postpredatory prices) or
encourage it (if regulators allow cross-subsidization that allows costs to be
passed on to the ratepayers). 130 For targeted pricing, the Bureau would
require similar tests or "ancillary evidence" of competitive harm, noting the
difficulty it and the Competition Tribunal have expressed in distinguishing
procompetitive from anticompetitive price cuts.' 3 ' Bundling could be illegal
both as a method for raising rivals' costs, akin to tying, or as a form of
predation.'
32
IV. THE GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL CUTS TO THE CHASE
As noted above, the Cabinet of Ministers can overturn a CRTC
decision. On December 11, 2006, Industry Minister Bernier proposed to do
so regarding forbearance. 33 He found that the CRTC's forbearance criteria
were too strict and would prevent the telecommunications sector from
realizing the full benefits of market forces. 34 He proposed replacing the
CRTC's share tests with a simple one-ILECs would have full pricing
flexibility in regions where subscribers have access to a telephone
company, cable broadband provider, and wireless service unaffiliated with
the first two. 3' He also proposed lifting all winback rules. 36 The
accompanying Regulatory Impact Statement noted that an acceptable
alternative would be the Bureau's proposed test, which would require only
two competitors-cable and ILEC-with a demonstration that the cable
company offers a viable alternative at variable costs no greater than the
127. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13, at 16.
128. Id. at 19-22.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 21-22.
131. Id. at 22.
132. Id. at 22.
133. Bernier, supra note 8.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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ILEC's and lacks significant capacity constraints, with evidence of
"vigorous rivalry."' 37
After the requisite 120-day period for consultation and public
comment, the proposed variance was adopted by the Governor in Council
on April 3, 2007.138 In its Order, the Governor in Council replaced the
CRTC's geographic market analysis and determinations with a single
statement that the local exchange is "the appropriate geographic component
of the relevant market.' ' 39 Applications for forbearance will be based on
exchanges, although applications "for a number of contiguous local
exchanges" may be considered as a single application. 4 ' The order also
repealed all winback prohibitions. 4'
Most significantly, the CRTC's aforementioned forbearance criteria
and the supporting discussion would forbear if either the ILEC "lacks
market power"-the phrase the Order uses to describe settings in which a
second provider meets the Bureau's criteria stated above-or for residential
customers, two independent facilities-based providers, at least one of which
is wire-based, "capable of serving at least 75% of the number of residential
local exchange service lines that the ILEC is capable of serving," and for
business customers, one fixed line meeting the seventy-five percent
capability test.'42 The ILEC would also have to meet the quality standards
for competitive services "during a six month period, beginning no earlier
than eight months before its application for local forbearance and ending at
any time before the [CRTC's] decision respecting the application.' 4 3
The phrasing of the final Order raises a number of questions for
Canadian regulatory and competition policy. In the direction of being too
strict, the requirement that competitors be capable of serving at least
seventy-five percent could mean that seventy-five percent of the people
might find them as an alternative. However, it could also mean they should
be able to handle demand from seventy-five percent of the customers at
once. If so, substantial excess capacity is necessary for competition.
Seventy-five percent of car drivers could choose Hondas, but Honda
probably isn't capable of selling cars to seventy-five percent of all drivers.
On the other hand, the order might be too lax. An ILEC could meet
the quality criterion for deregulation if it met competitor service standards
137. Order Varying Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15, Regulatory Impact Analysis,
Dec. 7, 2006, as reprinted in 140 C. GAz. 50 (Dec. 16, 2006), available at http://canadagaz
ette.gc.ca/partlI/2006/20061216/html/regle6-e.html.
138. Local Variance, supra note 10.
139. Id. atpara. 141.
140. Id. at para. 515.
141. Id. at para. 483.
142. Id. at para. 2(a)(ii).
143. Id. at para 242(b).
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for six months but then stopped interconnecting or providing access to
monopoly conduits and rights of way for two months prior to the
forbearance decision. More broadly, interpreting what we might label as
the Bureau's "one comparable cost, non-cooperating rival" standard as
saying that a firm lacks market power may make it difficult if not
impossible for the Bureau to contest mergers unless the merger creates
either an outright monopoly or facilitates a monopoly cartel.
V. ECONOMIC COMMENTS AND CRITIQUES
These developments invite comment on a number of economic
matters, to which we turn. Many of these warrant and have received
extensive analysis elsewhere.' 44
A. Regulation Within Markets
As discussed above, prior to the Order in Council, the CRTC planned
to continue to regulate the ILEC provision of VolP over digital broadband
DSL. That decision was not predicated on the competitive superiority of
the ILEC's VolP or dominance in VolP as such. Rather, it was because the
ILEC's VoP service was seen as a substitute for its standard circuit-
switched service, which was regulated. This seems paradoxical. If there are
substitutes for VoP, and VolP is in the same market as circuit-switched
service, then one might conclude that the ILEC lacks market power in the
latter and thus should be forborne.
However, assume that VoIP is a substitute, but other providers are
limited in some way, either by capacity constraint or because a substantial
fraction of subscribers would not switch. Then, a regulator might have a
legitimate question whether to deregulate VoP. The criterion would be
whether deregulation of a substitute would lead the regulated firm to
respond by migrating customers to that alternative. If this is possible,
deregulating the alternative could reduce welfare by evading the price
control and giving consumers an alternative that many deem inferior. Of
course, if this is not possible-consistent with the capacity constraint
argument supporting continued regulation in the first place--the ability of
the ILEC to respond tactically to partial forbearance would be limited and
the case against it weakened.
B. Measuring Potential Share
Under virtually any set of credibly proposed conditions for
forbearance, the competitive salience of VoP is crucial. As we see below,
144. Timothy Brennan, Fair Trade or Imperialism: Importing 'Merger Guidelines' into
(De)Regulatory Policy (July 7, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=915842.
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looking at actual shares may be problematic because of strategic reactions
induced among some and perhaps all competitors. Nevertheless, the
assessment of ILEC market power depends on the extent to which
telephone customers would be willing to switch to VolP if the price of
ILEC service were to increase by some undesirable amount, e.g., the small
but significant non-transitory increase in price used to define markets in the
Canadian and U.S. merger guidelines.1
45
In assessing the potential for VoIP competition, one proposal would
be to count the high-volume customers who have not yet switched to a
VoW provider but would save money by doing so, as the reduced usage
charges would make up for recurring fixed fees. On the other hand,
customers who would have lower rates under VolP than with the ILEC but
have not switched have revealed a preference for the ILEC's service. This
may be based on consumer "inertia," in particular, the costs of assessing
the merits of alternatives, service characteristics (e.g., the independently
powered ILEC network's reduced vulnerability to electricity outages), or
perceived reliability of the provider. Regardless of the basis for the
preference, the size of the subscriber base that would nominally have lower
rates under VolP but has not switched could speak to the weakness of VolP
as a competitor, not to its strength.
C. Service Market Definition
As just discussed, other than 1LEC arguments supporting VoP
forbearance prior to general forbearance of local exchange service, opinion
was virtually unanimous that VoP was in the same service market. As we
see below, wireless service has been more controversial. The Order of
Council varying the CRTC decision adopted a middle ground, saying that
an independent wireless provider would warrant forbearance but only if a
wireline provider is also in the market. 46 Two wireless providers would not
be enough, implying that wireless is something of a partial competitor-
relevant, but insufficient.
Such an approach has analogues in the U.S. The New York State
Department of Public Service has proposed a quantitative variant on this
theme, an index of market competition as follows:
The index gave weights to various options based on a judgment of the
degree of substitutability of the service and economic readiness of the
competitive carriers to expand existing offerings. The Department
assigned the following weights: cable telephone (weight of 1), CLEC
(a weight of 1 where providing residential service and a weight of 0.5
145. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at § 1.0; MERGER ENFORCE-
MENT GUIDELINES, supra note 28, at n.20.
146. Local Variance, supra note 10; replacement paragraph 242(a)(ii) to Telecom De-
cision CRTC 2006-15, supra note 1.
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where providing only business service), wireless (weight of 0.5),
[DSL-enabled] VoIP telephone (weight of 0.75). Beyond the traditional
wireline carrier, if competition were available from all the sources
described above in a given wire center, an index value of 3.25 would
be determined for that wire center. In the Department's judgment, an
index value of 2.75 or above indicated a level of competition sufficient
to conclude that competitive carriers will not be impaired without
access to unbundled switching. In other words, the wholesale market
was sufficiently open to competition to relax wholesale regulation. '47
According to this index, in New York, cable VoIP is in the market; wireless
gets a value of .5. On this account, two wireless providers would have the
same competitive significance as one cable provider (or other CLEC).
Apparently, stand-alone VoIP providers using ILEC facilities would
provide more competition than wireless. On the New York scale, the
Governor in Council would forbear with an index of 1.5, less than the 3.25
New York recommended in 2005. All this said, the only comment here is
that to my knowledge there is no analogue for counting firms as partial
participants in a market for competition assessments, e.g., in calculating
concentration measures or ascertaining competitive effects in merger cases.
The theoretical underpinnings, if any, of such measures remain to be
developed.
48
D. Geographic Market Definition
Both the CRTC and the Bureau took the view that the appropriate
geographic market definition for local exchange services is the consumer's
location (e.g., house). The basis for this claim is that consumers would not
regard a phone at some other location (e.g., the next door neighbor's house)
as a substitute. The only reason to use larger areas, such as the local
exchange (as the Governor in Council used) or the metropolitan area (as
proposed by the CRTC) was to aggregate the actual markets into something
administratively convenient.
Customer reluctance to go next door to use the phone misses the point
by proving too much and not enough. It proves too much because this
behavior could be applied to virtually any consumer product, not just
telephone service, implying that the customer's location is almost always
the geographic market in antitrust analysis. Since most consumers would
147. New York Public Service Communication, Hearing before Commission to Examine
Issues Related to the Transition to Intermodal Competition in the Provision of Telecommu-
nications Services, Order Initiating Proceeding and Inviting Comments, Case 05-C-0616
(June 29, 2005), at 9.
148. A second issue regarding service market definition is the extent to which static data
on people who have switched from ILEC service to wireless (or VoIP, for that matter) pro-
vides useful information on market definition. Brennan, supra note 139. We discuss this
below in considering the merits of share-based tests for forbearance.
[Vol. 60
CANADIAN DEREGULATION
not regard borrowing a neighbor's car as a substitute for using their own
car, the relevant market for cars would have to be the individual driveway
or parking space. One's unwillingness to cart dirty laundry next door would
make the geographic market for washers and dryers the laundry room.
Customer location proves not to be specific enough, however, because, on
that account, the geographic market is unstable for products consumed
while the customer is moving. That X would not want to borrow Y's cell
phone to make calls would mean that the relevant geographic market for
cell phones and cell phone service is wherever the customers happen to be
at any moment. The same might be said of cars, iPods, and shoes, with
geographic markets apparently in constant flux.
The error in the CRTC and Bureau's reasoning that leads to this
absurd geographic market definition is two-fold. First, it conflates the
characteristics of a product and service with the geographic nexus of
competition. Being able to make calls from one's home, or from one's
pocket with a cell phone, is a characteristic of the service being offered. It
places conventional telephone service in a separate market from, say, the
service offered by pay phones. As claimed by the CRTC and partially
claimed by the Governor in Council (and New York State), wireless
telephones may not be in the same market as wireline phones, but for
similar reasons-only one allows mobility but (so far) at higher prices.
Taxi service may not be a substitute for owning one's own car, outside
crowded urban areas. But in all those cases, the issue is the characteristic of
the product or service being purchased by consumers, not where the
consumer happens to be.
The second related error is that the purpose of identifying geographic
markets is to identify the locations of sellers that consumers regard as
substitutes, not the location of the services or products those sellers
provide. For local exchange service, the telephone companies serving
Montreal are not in the same geographic market as those serving Toronto,
because someone living in Toronto would not regard services offered by
Montreal companies as substitutes. This is so obvious that geographic
market definition in local exchange service is an uninteresting exercise.
This obviousness may be what led the CRTC and Bureau to adopt a
facially incorrect geographic market definition, thus making geographic
markets to be significant. But the Governor in Council probably came
closest to getting it right by using the phrase "the appropriate geographic
component of the relevant market."' 49 The most important location question
is not the geographic location of the sellers, but the extent to which
consumers in some area-the local exchange, interconnection area,
149. Local Variance, supra note 10.
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metropolitan area, or province-have access to multiple providers. That,
rather than the location of sellers (the usual application in merger cases) or
the locational characteristics of the service (the error here), matters for
asking whether the benefits of forbearance in the area in question to those
who have multiple alternatives within the exchange exceeds the costs of
forbearance from the potential exercise of market power to those who do
not. 150
E. Share Tests and Strategic Responses
Prior to the Governor in Council's variance of the CRTC decision,
virtually all participants in the proceeding accepted that lost market share
would be a criterion for forbearance. 5' Those in favor of forbearance, such
as the ILECs, were willing to go as low as five percent, while opponents of
forbearance asked for a minimum of thirty percent. 52 The CRTC chose
twenty-five percent for forbearance from regulation and twenty percent for
elimination of the winback restrictions. 53 The leading exceptions were the
Bureau and, later, the Governor in Council."' The Bureau's criteria spoke
to whether the ILEC's rival or rivals offered substitute services with similar
costs, lacked capacity constraints, and would compete rather than
collude.' The Governor in Council adopted the Bureau's criteria as one
basis for forbearance and also would forbear simply by counting
alternatives (with at least one wireline) that could offer service to seventy-
five percent of the lines in a local exchange.1 56
While share tests appeal to an intuition that customer shifting speaks
to the competitive power of rivals, it is a highly problematic test and should
be avoided for two reasons. The first is that whether any firm has market
power at current prices depends not on the number of people who have
switched at those prices, but whether enough would switch at higher prices
to make such increases unprofitable. For deregulation, "current" prices
would be regulated prices; and the higher prices might be those after
forbearance. 157 The number who have switched indicates a shift in the
150. The ability of ILECs to price discriminate between those who face competition and
those who do not may be strategically significant, as discussed below in considering policies
toward targeted pricing.
151. See text accompanying infra notes 61-85.
152. See text accompanying infra notes 66, 72, 77.
153. See text accompanying infra notes 1-2.
154. See text accompanying infra notes 114-15, 134-35
155. See text accompanying infra notes 112-14.
156. See text accompanying infra notes 135-37.
157. Brennan, supra note 144.
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demand curve but not necessarily an increase in its elasticity, which is what
determines market power.
158
A second problem with share tests is the foreseeable strategic
responses of the sector's participants. In this context, the concern is
twofold. Those seeking forbearance would want to undertake tactics to
boost the market share of their competitors. The usual way to do so is by
setting prices higher, but if regulation prevents that, the ILECs might
instead reduce service quality. Either tactic obtains deregulation by making
consumers worse off. On top of that, here, the rivals, particularly cable
VolP providers, want to retain regulation to prevent the ILECs from
charging low prices. If so, the cable companies too would want to hold
down their market shares to prevent forbearance. Hence, a share test has
the perverse result of inducing the two major local exchange service rivals
to try to reduce their market shares, "competing" to offer worse service at
higher prices.
F. Targeted Low Prices
For ILEC rivals to benefit from continued regulation, that regulation
must inhibit ILEC price cutting. An obvious criticism of this position is that
rivals always want to keep up the market price, to the detriment of
consumers. For the rivals' argument to protect competition rather than
competitors, ILEC price cutting must injure consumers in the long run.
The textbook example of this behavior is predatory pricing.159 The
"Chicago school" of antitrust called concern with predation into question.
Efforts to cut prices now would pay off only if the alleged monopolists
could raise prices after firms exit. Such price increases would be profitable
only if firms were dissuaded from re-entering, which postpredation high
prices would encourage. 160 More recent theories established the possibility
that low prices could be credible, but only if the predator had a reputation
for irrational price-cutting to preserve or if low prices signaled low capital
or production costs. 16 1 Because these circumstances are unlikely and price-
cutting is something that competition encourages, firms should be immune
from prosecution unless prices go so low as to be inconsistent with
158. An example may be useful. Because of cars, fewer people ride horses to work. But
that does not place horses and cars in the same market for antitrust purposes. Doing so
would imply that one would permit a merger of all car companies because consumers would
switch to horses if the price of cars rose by more than a trivial amount.
159. ERNEST GELHORN & WILLIAM KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS, 137-44
(1994).
160. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI.
L. REv. 263 (1981).
161. Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88
GEO. L. J. 2239, 2260-65 (2000).
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competition under any plausible circumstance. This is the primary
argument for why only below-cost prices should be predatory, even though
above-cost strategic price cuts may reduce welfare.
162
Targeted pricing may be more credible in that the incumbent
monopolist need not sacrifice profits across the entire market; it need only
sacrifice those to customers who might switch to the entrant. If the predator
can restrict price cuts to an identified subset of consumers that find the
entrant relatively attractive, the prospect of price cuts, even if above the
incumbent's costs, could deter entrants with entry costs high enough to
now be unprofitable but not so high to have kept them out in the first
place. 63 As the Bureau's draft Telecommunications Abuse Bulletin
acknowledges, one is still left with the problem of distinguishing good
price cutting from bad price cutting.164 In practice, as the Bureau says, the
plaintiff should bear a high burden of proof, showing that targeted prices
meet general predatory tests or providing substantial evidence (e.g.,
internal planning documents) that a targeted price strategy would be
effective and provide a sufficient credible future threat to lead to higher
prices overall.
G. Defining "Dominance"
For purposes of ascertaining whether a practice by a forborne ILEC or
other telecommunications firm constitutes "abuse of dominance" in
162. For the former, see Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out En-
trants Are Not Predatory-and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112
YALE L.J. 681 (2003); for the latter, to which Elhauge is responding, see Aaron Edlin, Stop-
ping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002).
163. Mark Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination,
in ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH
WORLD CONGRESS 97, 127-28 (Richard Blundell et al, eds. 2006).
164. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13, at 21-22. Filings by economists on be-
half of Bell Canada in the CRTC's proceeding on price cap (McFetridge, Hariton and
Krause) suggested that allowing for price discrimination can increase the intensity of price
competition. Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership, Bell Canada and
Saskatchewan Telecommunications, Submission, Canada Radio and Telecommunications
Commission, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2006-5. The intuition is that if each firm has a
set of customers who prefer its product, allowing it to cut prices selectively will increase the
willingness of each firm to try to capture the other's customers. As each becomes more in-
terested in trying to capture the other's prime customers, the increased competitive intensity
reduces price to all customers. See also James Cooper et al., Does Price Discrimination
Intensify Competition? Implications for Antitrust, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 327, 373 (2005).
This theory requires that consumers have negatively correlated preferences across sellers,
i.e., those willing to pay more for VolP service have a lower willingness to pay for ILEC
voice service, and vice versa. For the theory to be empirically important, each firm must be
able to set prices substantially above cost to its preferred customers, suggesting that they
(particularly the ILEC) might have sufficient market power to fail to meet conditions for
forbearance.
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Canadian law, or whether it should or should not be regulated, one needs to
determine when a firm is dominant. A special case is when a firm has an
"essential facility." Leaving aside legal questions of whether an "essential
facility" doctrine has any force in antitrust law, 165 the definition question
regarding whether a single firm has market power remains. This economic
question, as the Bureau's Telecommunications Abuse Bulletin points out, is
difficult. 66 It differs from defining markets in merger cases, because there
the issue is whether combining firms would make matters worse, not
whether matters are bad at present. 67 With single firm conduct, the
hypothetical "but for market power" price is not observed.
The definition of market power suggests an answer in principle.
Market power implies that a firm finds it profitable to reduce output in
order to raise price. If the firm were not able to raise price, because of an
exogenously-enforced ceiling below the price it is charging, it would not
find output reductions profitable. A mandated price reduction would lead to
an increase in output. This differs from competition, in which a reduction
in price reduces a firm's output. With competition, the firm's only interest
is in selling as much as it can at the going rate, and reducing price makes
sales at the margin unprofitable, reducing supply.
We then have a test: reduce price by a small but significant,
nontransitory amount, and see what the firm does. If reducing price
increases output, the firm has market power; if not, it doesn't.
68
Unfortunately, natural experiments supplying an exogenous price limit are
unlikely. The test requires regulation to see what the firm does; a firm,
realizing the purpose of the test, would cut output just to ensure that
regulation is not imposed. We are thus probably left with having to judge
dominance, or whether a "facility" is "essential," based on conventional
indicia of competitiveness, with the Cellophane fallacy kept in mind.
69
H. Building Access
The Shaw comments in the CRTC's local forbearance proceeding
illustrated the importance that many parties attach to the ability to have
access to multiple dwelling units ("MDUs"), primarily office buildings and
apartments that provide the premises for numerous potential customers of
local telecommunications services. The intuition behind this concern is
165. Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) (reiterating that the essential facility doc-
trine has no legal force in U.S. antitrust law).
166. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13, at 5-6.
167. Lawrence White, Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A Paradigm is Miss
ing, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY (Wayne D. Collins ed., 2007).
168. For more on this test, see Brennan, supra note 149.
169. See supra note 119.
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compelling. Tenants in an MDU have no opportunity to switch suppliers
unless those suppliers can get lines to them. Wireless providers are not as
handicapped, but cable providers, relying on physical wires to carry voice,
video, and broadband data, would be impeded without access.
This intuition is not as compelling as it may appear. One could view
the telecommunications service supplied by an MDU provider as one of
many amenities that are part of the package offered to potential tenants in
the overall market for apartments or offices, whether leased or purchased.
In principle, it would be equivalent to say that MDU owners should provide
ventilation ducts to alternative heating and air conditioning providers so
that they could compete against the provider already in the building.
Running additional lines into an already-constructed building is, if not as
bad as running new ventilation systems, a nontrivial installation project.
However, we are not starting from an equal starting point. The ILEC
begins with one hundred percent of the market, as the entity that installed
the wiring to and into the MDU. With deregulation, the ILEC would in
effect have exclusive access to those buildings. It would thus have market
power, not over telecommunications per se, but over the buildings
themselves, as the only option for tenants would be to not rent offices or to
go to new construction.170 If new construction would constrain market
power of existing buildings, there is no problem, as those tenants who
preferred an alternative telecommunications provider could find one in a
new building, just as apartment renters can choose buildings on the basis of
the type of exercise equipment. If not-if we would care if all the existing
buildings merged-then a remedy would be necessary to prevent a
forborne ILEC from exercising market power. In theory, the best remedy
would be for the ILEC to sell the MDU-specific access lines to the MDU at
the depreciated book value, to ensure that the ILEC is properly
compensated relative to the expectations of cost recovery that it had when
it constructed those lines.
. Timing of Intervention
Whether to forbear represents a choice between ex ante regulation of
prices and business practices and ex post law enforcement to deter
anticompetitive conduct by penalizing particular practices. The TPRP
Report's recommendation of a Telecommunications Competition Tribunal
reflects a belief that ex post enforcement, drawing on competition and
communications expertise, would be an effective substitute for CRTC
170. For an elaboration of this "complementary market" perspective on exclusive dealing
arrangements, see Timothy Brennan, Saving Section 2: Reframing US. Monopolization
Law, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST 417-51 (Vivek Ghosal & Johan Stennec
eds., 2007).
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regulation. 7' The Order in Council overturning the CRTC's forbearance
criteria also reflects a preference for ex post enforcement.' The Bureau's
draft Telecommunications Abuse Bulletin outlines how such matters might
be adjudicated.'73
A first aspect of the choice is that antitrust law in Canada and the U.S.
does not treat unilateral price setting as a matter for prosecution.' 74 To the
extent that one is concerned with a firm setting a monopoly price, the only
option is regulation-recognizing, of course, that regulation has its costs as
well. The same problem plagues some possible ex post interventions. One
might determine that some practices, e.g., discriminatory access or tying,
violated competition law. The most relevant examples in this context are
contentions that an ILEC monopolized a related market by denying access
to an "essential facility." Improving economic performance in those
markets will inevitably require setting access prices; otherwise, the firm
could exploit most or all of its market power by setting a nondiscriminatory
monopoly access price.'
A second concern in Canada involves the deterrent effects of ex post
enforcement. Under Canadian competition law, abuse of dominance is
subject only to injunctive relief. Private parties can bring abuse cases but,
unlike in the United States, they cannot collect damages for harm.
Recognizing this, Canada's Minister of Industry recommended on
December 7, 2006, shortly before proposing to overturn the CRTC
forbearance decision, that Parliament amend the Competition Act to
provide for up to $15 million in administrative monetary penalties
("AMPs") for violations by telecommunications companies. To my
knowledge, the Competition Act has not yet been amended to allow for
AMPs in this sector.
76
J. Regulated Conduct
In its draft Telecommunications Abuse Bulletin, the Bureau took the
position that it would not enforce the Competition Act when activities
171. TPRP Report, supra note 11.
172. Local Variance, supra note 10.
173. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13.
174. U.S. v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300 (1919). ("In the absence of any purpose to create or
maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manu-
facturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent dis-
cretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he may announce in advance
the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell."). Id at 307.
175. Timothy Brennan, Do Easy Cases Make Bad Law? Antitrust Innovations or Missed
Opportunities in U.S. v. Microsoft, 69 GEO. WASH. L. R. 1042, 1082 (2001).
176. Bernier, supra note 8. In 2005, the Bureau proposed amendments to the Competi-
tion Act that would institute AMPs for abuse of dominance generally. This proposal was not
enacted before the dissolution of Parliament prior to the election in January 2006.
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involving access to regulated facilities impeded competition. Recently,
Dennis Carlton suggested that limiting the role of antitrust in regulated
sectors is a desirable division of policy labor. 177 This position is consistent
with that taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Trinko, which stated that the
costs of requirements to deal with competitors exceed the benefits when a
regulator is in place to oversee competition.
171
This standpoint is reflected in Canadian competition policy. The
Bureau stated in its June 2006 Bulletin on Regulated Conduct that it would
enforce the Competition Act in regulated industries:
[W]here Parliament has articulated an intention to displace competition
law enforcement by establishing a comprehensive regulatory regime
and providing a regulator the authority to itself take, or to authorize
another to take, action inconsistent with the Act, provided the regulator
has exercised its regulatory authority in respect of the conduct in
question. 179
As CRTC authority falls under "a comprehensive regulatory scheme"
enacted by Parliament, this view is repeated in the Bureau's draft
Telecommunications Abuse Bulletin with regard to access to regulated
telecommunications facilities.8 °
The difficulty with this position is that the actions under regulatory
authority may impede competition in unregulated markets, which may not
be under the regulator's purview. The antitrust case leading to the
divestiture of AT&T was predicated on a theory that antitrust law can and
should provide structural remedies to anticompetitive conduct by regulated
firms, when such conduct leads to the monopolization of unregulated
markets.181 It remains to be seen whether its competition policy interests
are better served by deferring to regulators. At best, the regulators are
likely to be more concerned with promoting the public interest in the
sectors that remain regulated rather in those it has elected to deregulate (or
never regulated in the first place. At worst, they may be unduly influenced
by the firms they are nominally assigned to regulate."2 We have had
roughly a quarter century of U.S. telecommunications experience since the
break-up of AT&T as one part of the experiment. Whether this change in
the law represented by Trinko and the Bureau's view of the "Regulated
177. Dennis Carlton & Randal Picker, Antitrust and Regulation, (Univ. of Chicago Law
& Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 312, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=937020.
178. Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
179. COMPETITION BUREAU, TECHNICAL BULLETIN ON 'REGULATED' CONDUCT, June
2006, available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/PDFs/finalrcdbulletine.pdf.
180. Telecomm. Abuse Bulletin, supra note 13, at n.7.
181. Timothy Brennan, Trinko v. Baxter: The Demise of U.S. v. AT&T, 50 ANTITRUST
BULLETIN 634, 664 (2006).
182. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAG-
MEMENT SCIENCE 3 (1971).
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Conduct Doctrine" produces similar benefits over the next twenty-five
years remains to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Canadian telecommunications sector, including industry
participants (ILECs, cable providers, stand-alone retail service companies),
market observers, regulators, competition enforcers, and the top levels of
government, have engaged in a complex and protracted exercise over the
last two years to determine whether, how, when, and under what conditions
the last regulated telecommunications service, local voice service, should
be deregulated. For regulatory policy analysts and decision makers, the
Canadian experience provides useful lessons in how the deregulation can
be approached. The fruitfulness of the lessons is enhanced by a variety of
factors. Canada is geographically proximate to the U.S., with roughly
comparable per capita incomes and an almost identical urban/rural
population split, and a leading trade partner. Although smaller in
population than the U.S., it still has a population comparable to that of
California.
1 83
Perhaps most important, Canada's overall policy objectives, including
adoption of competition as a policy norm, is very similar to that in the U.S.
The similarity of ends makes the comparison of means--different policies,
legal structures, and implementation-potentially insightful. In this and
other areas, U.S. analysts and policymakers may be able to learn a great
deal by looking at the Canadian experience.
183. In 2001, Statistics Canada reported an urban/rural split of 80/20. Comparable fig-
ures for the U.S. in the 2000 Census were 79/21.
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